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                          Housing and commuting in an 
extended monocentric model 
Vincent Breteau and Fabien Leurent  
Université Paris-Est LVMT Ecole des Ponts ParisTech 
Abstract 
We model a city in which jobs are exogenous and distributed across an extended business 
area in which transport has a nonzero cost. Households are homogeneous in terms of utility 
and gross income, but each household chooses its residential location on the basis of its place 
of employment, which is deemed to be fixed. 
Equilibrium conditions for this residential location market are established. It is shown that 
there is an equilibrium that is unique (for a closed city with absentee landlords). Households’ 
utility and dwelling size increase the farther the workplace is from the centre, whereas land 
rent decreases. 
Within a simplified framework, the model is resolved analytically and we establish the 
sensitivity of the endogenous variables to the city’s characteristic parameters. Two extreme 
cases are highlighted: the “quasi-monocentric” city where net income decreases with distance 
from the centre, versus the “eccentric” city, where net income increases with distance from 
the centre. 
 
JEL Classification: R21 
Keywords: Residential Location, Land Markets, Commuting 
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1. Introduction 
Commuting represents a substantial proportion of total urban traffic, and one that is relatively 
regular in terms of its origin-destination and timing structure: it provides a framework for 
transport planning and is relatively easy to study (Kwan, 1999). That is why the distance 
between home and the workplace, and its variations in space, have been extensively studied, 
whether in geography and urban planning (e.g. Massot & Korsu, 2006; Shearmur, 2006) or in 
economics and regional sciences (e.g. Hamilton, 1982; Crane, 1996; Wheaton, 2004). 
 
Commuting costs represent a fundamental variable in the monocentric city model, where all 
jobs are concentrated in a single place, the Central Business District (CBD). This model plays 
a central role in urban economics (Alonso, 1964; Muth, 1969; Mills, 1972). However, the 
hypothesis of a single, point-wise employment place gives a highly reductive picture of the 
spread of urban employment (McMillen & McDonald, 1998; Glaeser & Kahn, 2001): some 
authors have therefore proposed polycentric models, first as an extension to the monocentric 
model (Ogawa & Fujita, 1980; Fujita, 1985; Grimaud, 1989) then in a more general context 
(Anas & Kim, 1996; Lucas & Rossi-Hansberg, 2002), whilst Anas, Arnott & Small (1998) 
provide a general discussion of modern urban structure. Halfway between the two types of 
extension, Wheaton (2004) has modelled a spatial mix of residential and productive locations 
within a monocentric framework:from this he deduced that there is a significant concentration 
of jobs in the agglomeration centre at urban equilibrium, and an even greater concentration at 
the optimal state. 
 
In this article, we consider a city where jobs are distributed exogenously and in an extended 
area where the cost of transport is nonzero. In addition to these hypotheses, already present in 
Sullivan (1983a,b), we also assume households to be homogeneous in terms of utility and 
gross income and each household to have a fixed place of employment that influences its 
residential location. Our model is therefore one of medium-term equilibrium, where 
households participate in the housing market whereas employers remain static. We show that 
residential location, household utility and living space increase the farther the workplace is 
from the centre, whereas land rent decreases. 
 
For simple forms of utility function, transport costs, employment density and land use 
capacity, we resolve residential location, land rent, lot size and residential density analytically 
on the basis of workplace location. We show that for each workplace location, each of these 
functions varies monotonically in relation to the characteristic parameters of the city: the 
radius limiting the location of firms, their local density, the land capacity, the alternative rent, 
the gross income, and the preferences between living space and the other goods. 
 
The article is structured as follows: section 2 focuses on presenting the model and 
determining the equilibrium location of households. Section 3 defines the urban equilibrium 
and describes the necessary and sufficient conditions for it. In section 4, we study the 
structural properties of the model in its general form. Section 5 looks at the equilibrium in a 
simplified framework and establishes analytical properties, with closed formulas for the 
endogenous variables, which enables their sensitivity to urban parameters to be analysed. 
Section 6 concludes the article. 
Breteau, Leurent V. 5 2010-07-23 
Housing and commuting in an extended monocentric model  3
2. The model 
2.1. About firms and workplaces 
Consider a city in which firms, and therefore jobs, are distributed around a centre in a disk of 
radius ρ f : we call it the CBD or the employment area. Jobs are assumed to be distributed 
following a radial density )f(ρ  that is non-zero on an interval of [0,ρ f ], yielding a 
cumulative distribution function ∫=
ρρ
0
d)f()F( rr . 
The function F  is therefore strictly increasing. The number of jobs is fixed at N , therefore 
F(ρ f ) = N . Using a fixed number of jobs places us in the theoretical framework of a closed 
city. We also make the assumption that the landowners are absent. 
2.2. Households 
As regards households, let us assume: (H1) that the households are located in a ring around 
the employment area. (H2) That the households are homogeneous in their preferences. 
(H3) That each household has only one member that is employed by a firm in the CBD. 
(H4) That each household receives an income Y
 
from this job, independent of residential and 
professional location (i.e. employers are indifferent to the location of their personnel): this is a 
very reductive hypothesis for the statistical distribution of incomes, since empirical research 
has shown the existence of an income gradient within cities (Eberts, 1981; McMillen & 
Singell, 1992; Timothy & Wheaton, 2001). Nevertheless, Glaeser & Kahn (2001) have shown 
that employment deconcentration tends to generate equalisation of incomes. 
Finally, (H5) households are differentiated by their place of employment. The choice of a 
residential location in r  by a household whose workplace is ρ , leaves them a net income of 
),T( rYI ρ−= , where ),T( ⋅⋅  is the cost of transport. 
A household’s utility U  depends on the size of its living space, s, and on the quantity z  of a 
composite consumer product treated as numeraire. The function U  is assumed to be 
increasing and continually differentiable into each of its variables. In general terms, each 
household is deemed to be a rational decision maker, which seeks to maximise its utility 
within its budget constraint. 
2.3. Spatial structure of the residential area 
We are interested here in the land use market within the residential zone only: the unit price 
of land in r , or land rent, is denoted R(r) . The opportunity cost of the land, corresponding to 
an alternative use (e.g. agricultural), is denoted RA . The economic programme of the 
household employed in ρ  is expressed as follows: 
 
 
),T().(.t.s
),U(max
,,
rYsrRz
szszr
ρ−≤+
 (2.1) 
  
To analyse land occupancy, the density of the households in r  is denoted h(r) . This is the 
main endogenous variable in our model. By way of hypothesis, h(r) = 0 where r ∈ [0,r0[ . 
Following Fujita (1989), it can be shown that if local land capacity )L(r  is strictly positive, 
then h(r) > 0 between r0 and the radius of the city rA , from which land rent is equal to 
agricultural rent. The cumulative household distribution function, H(r) = h(r)dr
r0
r
∫ , is thus 
strictly increasing.
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Regarding the transport cost, it is assumed that ),T( rρ  is a decreasing function in ρ  and 
increasing in r . 
2.4. Equilibrium location of households  
To analyse the choice of household location, we follow Von Thünen (1826) and Alonso 
(1964) in defining the bid-rent function of a household employed in ρ , Ψρ (r,u), as the 
maximum unit rent that that household is willing to pay to live in r  whilst maintaining a 
utility level u . In other words: 
 
 }),U(),T({max),(
,
usz
s
zrY
ur sz =
−−
=Ψ ρρ  (2.2) 
   
This fixed ρ  formulation possesses the same properties of continuity and ingress in r  and in 
u as in the basic model. The dwelling size Sρ (r,u)  at maximum bid in the previous 
optimisation problem, is increasing in r  and in u. 
On the basis of land rent R and available income ),T( rYI ρρ −= , we can also set the indirect 
utility function for a household, which plays a fundamental role later on, since it does not 
depend on ρ : 
 
 }),U({max),V(
, ρρ IRszszIR sz ≤+=  (2.3) 
 
The function ),V( ρIR  is continuous in R and Iρ , increasing in Iρ  and decreasing in R. This 
latter property implies that: 
 
 )),,(V()),(V( ρρρ IurIrR Ψ><  as R(r) >< Ψρ (r,u)  (2.4) 
 
As uIur =Ψ )),,(V( ρρ , property (2.4) implies a rule a la Fujita (1989), characterising the 
optimum location of a household employed in ρ  and encountering supply conditions R(r) : 
 
Rule 1 (Optimisation of residential location) Given land rent function R(r) , a household 
employed in ρ  optimises its utility ˜ uρ  in a place of residence ˜ rρ  if and only if 
R( ˜ rρ ) = Ψρ (˜ rρ , ˜ uρ )   and R(r) ≥ Ψρ (r, ˜ uρ ), ∀r . 
 
If R and Ψρ  are differentiable in ˜ rρ , then the rule requires that the two curves are tangent at 
this point. By applying the envelope theorem to the bid-rent function (2.2), we deduce Muth’s 
relation: 
 
 )~,~(/)
~
,T()~( ρρρρρ
ρ
urS
r
r
rR
∂
∂
−=
&
 (2.5) 
 
We use )(rg&
 
to denote the derivative of a function g(r) relative to r . 
Carrying out this analysis for a particular household makes it possible to compare households 
  i ∈ {1,2} with different places of employment. We show in the paragraph 8.1 of the appendix 
that if ρ1 < ρ2 , then the bid curve Ψ1(r,u1) of household 1 is steeper than the curve Ψ2(r,u2) 
of household 2, so the Fujita (1989, p. 28) rule 2.3 applies and produces the following result. 
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Proposition 1 (on the order of households in the residential zone) If two household indexed 
1 and 2 are such that ρ1 < ρ2  then ˜ rρ1 < ˜ rρ 2: the order of households in the residential zone is 
the same as the order of their respective jobs in the employment zone. 
 
The converse implication directly arises from this. 
 
Corollary 1. All households living in r  work in the same place. 
 
So at equilibrium, a household’s number in the employment order, )F(ρ , coincides with its 
number in the residence order, H(r) . We define the function ωr  which associates the place of 
residence of the corresponding household r  with a workplace ρ , i.e. )(ρρ ωra  such that 
)F())(( ρρω =rH . Formally, the functions are linked by the following relation: 
 
 
1−
= ωrFH o  (2.6) 
 
Let us call ωr
 
the function for the commute from work to home, and its inverse 1−= ωωρ r  the 
function for the commute from home to work. By composition of increasing functions, these 
two functions are increasing. 
3. The urban equilibrium  
Having stated the main characteristics of the model and established certain properties of 
household location, let us look at urban equilibrium, restricted here to the equilibrium of the 
household location system. The aim is to determine two things at the same time: on the 
demand side, household location expressed by the density function h(r)  or its primitive 
H(r) , and on the supply side, land rent R(r) . 
Our objective is to define urban equilibrium in an appropriate mathematical form to 
demonstrate the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. The appropriate form is a 
differential system that links residential distribution and land rent to residential position. 
3.1. The household location market 
On the demand side, for a fixed land rent function R(r) , a household employed in ρ  chooses 
a residential location r  that maximises its utility. In any potential position r  the household 
would require a certain living space and a certain quantity of consumption goods, which 
would optimise its utility under price condition R(r)  within budget constraint 
),T(
,
rYI r ρρ −= . The level of utility associated with r  is therefore )),(V( ,rIrR ρ . We denote 
this as follows: 
 
 )),(V(),(
,rIrRrW ρρ =  (3.1) 
 
A household requiring a residential location seeks a position of maximum utility for itself: so 
its microeconomic programme is: 
 
 
maxr W (r,ρ)  (3.2) 
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Let ˆ r ρ denote the optimised position, ˜ uρ  the optimal utility and ˜ sρ   the living space obtained 
by the household under these conditions. If the distribution of households is optimized, 
necessarily )F()ˆ( ρρ =rH , therefore: 
 
 )()F(~ 1 ρρ ωρ rHr == − o  (3.3) 
 
On the supply side, if the distribution of households is set at H(r)  with radial density 
h(r) ≥ 0, without providing details on the landowners, each local unit price reaches the 
maximum value that a household is willing to pay, or the agricultural price RA . The 
associated microeconomic condition is: 
 
   
R(r) = max{RA , maxρ Ψρ (r, ˜ uρ ) }  (3.4) 
 
In addition, beyond the boundary radius rA such that H(rA ) = N  the total number of 
households, land rent is equal to agricultural rent: 
 
 R(r) = RA = Ψρ f (rA , ˜ uρ f ) ,  ∀r ≥ rA  (3.5) 
 
Finally, in any position r ≥ r0 such that R(r) > RA , radial land capacity )L(r  is saturated, 
therefore: 
 
 )L(~)( rsrh =ρ   if  )()F(1 ρρ ωrHr == − o  (3.6) 
 
Let us summarise these considerations with a formal definition: 
 
Definition 1 (Urban Equilibrium) This is a pair of functions (H,R) on ZH = [r0,+∞[  such 
that H  increases from 0  to N  until rA ≥ r0 then remains constant, which verifies conditions 
(3.2-6). 
 
3.2. Alternative definition 
By denoting ZF = [0,ρ f [ , condition (3.2) becomes: 
 
 W (rω (ρ),ρ) ≥ W ( ′ r ,ρ),  ∀( ′ r ,ρ) ∈ ZH × ZF   (3.7) 
 
In equilibrium, F1 o−= Hrω  is an increasing function as the composition of two increasing 
functions.  The inverse mapping ωρ  is also increasing. Let us set ρ ∈ ZF  and )(ρωrr =′ , 
therefore ρ = ρω ( ′ r ) . Condition (3.7) implies: 
 
 W ( ′ r ,ρω ( ′ r )) ≥ W (r,ρω ( ′ r )) ,  ∀(r, ′ r ) ∈ ZH × rω (ZF )  (3.8) 
 
Definition 2 (Supply-demand equilibrium of the residential location system) This is a pair 
of functions (H,R) on ZH  such that H  increases from 0  to N  until rA ≥ r0 then remains 
constant, which verifies conditions (3.8), (3.3-6). 
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Proposition 2 (equivalence of the equilibrium definitions) An urban equilibrium is a supply-
demand equilibrium of the residential location system, and reciprocally. 
 
Proof. We deduced (3.8) from (3.2), therefore the system defining a supply-demand 
equilibrium is verified by an urban equilibrium. Reciprocally, for ρ ∈ ZF , condition (3.8) for 
)(ρωrr =′  produces (3.7) therefore (3.2): therefore a supply-demand equilibrium is an urban 
equilibrium. 
 
3.3. Characteristic differential system 
Let there be a supply-demand equilibrium such that functions R and H  are “sufficiently 
regular”. Then the first-order necessary optimality condition associated with (3.8) is 
∂W (r,ρ) /∂r = 0  at point )(rωρρ = , therefore: 
 
 
Ir
rr
R
rR
∂
∂
∂
∂
=
∂
∂ V)),(T(V)( ωρ&
 (3.9) 
  
By Roy’s identity, the (Marshallian) surface demand function verifies IRIR ∂∂∂∂−= VV /),(sˆ , 
therefore the previous relation is reformulated: 
 
 ),(sˆ/)),(T()(
,rIR
r
rr
rR ρω
ρ
∂
∂
−=
&
 (3.10) 
 
We are back to Muth’s relation. 
 
On the supply side, (3.6) results in )(/)L(),(sˆ rhrIR =  for Hh &= , therefore: 
 
 ),(sˆ/)L()(
,rIRrrH ρ=&  (3.11) 
 
Since HF o1−=ωρ , the relations (3.10) and (3.11) constitute a differential system in (H,R): 
 
 




−=
=




=
−=
−
∂
∂
)),(T(
)(F)(
where),(ˆ/)L()(
),(sˆ/)(
,
1
,
,
)),(T(
rrYI
rHr
IRsrrH
IRrR
rr
rr
rr
ωρ
ω
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρω o
&
&
 (3.12) 
 
Proposition 3 (Necessary condition on urban equilibrium) At urban equilibrium the pair 
(H,R) verifies the differential system (3.12). In addition, the boundary conditions have an 
initial value H(r0) = 0  for H  and a terminal value R(rA ) = RA  in rA such that 
)F()( fA NrH ρ== . 
 
Let us now reverse the perspective, considering (H,R) obtained by integrating the differential 
system (3.12). We interpret R(r)  at the unit prices for dwelling space at location r . Then: 
 
Proposition 4 (Sufficient conditions for urban equilibrium) Let there be a pair of functions 
(H,R) which verifies (3.12). 
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(i) Under price conditions R(r) , if the dwelling space is a normal good, then a household 
employed in ρ  and seeking accommodation has an optimal location in )(ρωr  where 1−= ωω ρr . 
In other words, (3.12a) leads to (3.8). 
(ii) Assuming furthermore (3.5), then condition R(r)  coincides with the economic behaviour 
that optimises the supply of living space in r : each supplier of living space selects the 
maximum bid by households for its product. In other words, conditions (3.12) and (3.10) 
imply condition (3.4). 
(iii) Under these microeconomic conditions, in any position r  such that R(r) > RA  local land 
capacity L(r) is equal to local demand by all households. 
(iv) In all, conditions (3.12) and (3.10) describe an urban equilibrium. 
 
The proof is provided in paragraph 8.2 of the appendix. 
 
3.4. Properties of the differential system 
 
Proposition 5 (Formal properties of the differential system) Where R0 = R(r0)  is fixed, the 
differential system determines: 
(i) a function H  which increases with r . Therefore the function )(rr ωρa  is increasing. 
(ii) a function R which decreases with r . 
(iii) a utility function ˜ uρ  which increases with ρ : equivalently, the function 
)),(V( (r),rρωIrRr a   where ),T( rYI r ρρ −= , is increasing. 
(iv) a lot size function (dwelling size) )),((sˆ)( ),( rrIrRrSr ωρ=a  which increases with r  if the 
dwelling space is a normal good. 
 
For proof, see paragraph 8.3 of the appendix, whereas the next proposition is demonstrated in 
paragraph 8.4. 
 
Proposition 6 (Algorithmic property of the differential system) For two initial values R01 
and R02 > R01, the respective solutions (H1,R1)  and (H2,R2)  of the differential system satisfy, 
in each position r : R1 ≤ R2; H1 ≤ H2; S1 ≥ S2; 21 ωω ρρ ≤ ; rrrr II ),(),( 21 ωω ρρ ≤ . 
 
Proposition 7 (Ending integration) System integration is ended when R attains RA  or H  
attains N . If 0sˆ >≥ ε  such that Nrrr
r
ε≥∫
ˆ
0
d)L(
 for acceptable ˆ r , the integration necessarily 
produces such a state. 
 
Proof. Starting from R0 ≥ RA , since R is decreasing, we either obtain RA  or R remains > RA . 
If RA  is obtained in rA , as the value of H  increases from 0  in r0, the value it reaches in rA  is 
less than N , otherwise one would have stopped earlier. If RA  is not reached, the additional 
condition ensures that H  attains N , and as soon as this value is reached, the integration can 
be ended. 
 
3.5. Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium 
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Proposition 8 (Existence and uniqueness of urban equilibrium) (i) There exists a value ˆ R 0 
such that the integration of the differential system (3.12) produces an urban equilibrium. 
(ii) This value is unique, as is the urban equilibrium. 
 
The proof is provided in paragraph 8.5 of the appendix, with a dichotomous algorithm. 
Equivalently with this dichotomous algorithm, we can define a function which at any initial 
integration value R0 of the differential system, associates the position ˆ r(R0)  in which 
H( ˆ r (R0)) = N . The condition in Property 7 ensures the existence of such a position. 
Proposition 6 ensures that   R0 a ˆ r(R0)  is a decreasing function, because for R01 < R02 , it is 
verified in any r  that H1(r) ≤ H2(r) , therefore H  attains the value N  for R02  in a position 
ˆ r (R02)  that is lower than the position for R01 . 
 
We can also associate the value γ(R0) = R(ˆ r (R0) R0)  of the integrated rent function with  R0, 
starting from the initial value of R0. The function γ  is increasing in R0 because 
  
(r,x) a R(r x) is a decreasing function in r  and increasing in x, and as ˆ r(R0)  decreases with 
R0, through the composition of two decreasing functions,   R0 a R( ˆ r (R0) R0) is an increasing 
function. 
 
By the same arguments as used in the proof of proposition 8, the function ˆ r  takes low values 
where R0 is high and high values where R0 is low, therefore γ  takes high values where R0 is 
high and low where R0 is low. Urban equilibrium is characterised by the condition that 
γ( ˆ R 0) = RA . Therefore, our function γ  plays a similar role in our model as the rent boundary 
function used by Fujita (1989) to tackle the classical model with a point-wise CBD and a 
homogeneous population of households. We call it the terminal rent function. 
 
4. Structural properties of urban equilibrium 
We have already established, for any initial rent value 0R , that maximum utility and dwelling 
space are functions that increase with residential position. In this part, we examine the 
variation in the net income function and analyse the sensitivity of the urban equilibrium to 
alternative rent (agricultural). 
4.1. Variations in net income 
Net income rrIrI ),()(ˆ ωρ=  where ),T(, rYI r ρρ −=  varies with location r  firstly directly and 
decreasingly, and secondly indirectly via )(rωρ  and increasingly. The two opposing 
influences become superimposed with a variable result, which we can illustrate in 
characteristic situations. 
The total influence is determined by the total derivative: 
 
]
T/
T/)[T(
ˆˆ)(ˆ
d
d
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρρ
ω
ω
∂∂
∂∂
+
∂
∂
−=
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
=
r
II
r
rI
r
&
&
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By assumption, 0T/ ≤∂∂ ρ  and 0T/ ≥∂∂ r , therefore dˆ I /dr  is positively proportional to the 
sum of a positive term, ωρ&  and of a negative term, ρ∂
∂
∂
∂ TT /
r
. 
For the first term, let us define the concentration of housing relative to jobs as the condition 
that 1≤ωr& , which is equivalent to 1≥ωρ& . Symmetrically, the deconcentration of housing 
relative to jobs is the condition that 1≥ωr& , equivalent to 1≤ωρ& . 
As regards the second term, we know the congested situation of many urban road networks, 
where traffic time and costs, per journey and per unit of distance, are higher in the centre than 
on the outskirts: then 
r∂
∂
∂
∂ ≥ TTρ  therefore 1/
TT
−≥∂
∂
∂
∂
ρr . 
Conversely, in the absolute it should be possible to invest in the transport system by 
prioritising very massive and efficient transport modes near the city centre, where volumes 
are highest, in order to ensure 
r∂
∂
∂
∂ ≤ TTρ  therefore 1/
TT
−≤∂
∂
∂
∂
ρr , in the situation of sufficient 
massification. 
Our first characteristic situation is a city where housing is deconcentrated relative to jobs and 
transport massification is sufficient: in this case, net income falls the further residential 
location is from the centre. Indeed, 0)(ˆdd ≤rIr  since ρωρ ∂∂∂∂−≤≤ TT /1 r& . 
The second characteristic situation is a city where housing is concentrated relative to jobs and 
the transport network is congested: here, net income increases with distance from the centre, 
since ρωρ ∂
∂
∂
∂
−≥≥ TT /1
r
&
 therefore 0)(ˆdd ≥rIr . 
4.2. Influence of alternative rent on urban equilibrium 
Alternative (agricultural) rent RA  is the main boundary condition restricting the 
agglomeration in a closed city model. As the terminal rent is an increasing function, we know 
that for two given values RA
1 < RA
2
 the respective urban equilibriums correspond to ˆ R 01 < ˆ R 02, 
therefore to terminal radii ˆ r( ˆ R 01) > ˆ r( ˆ R 02): a higher alternative rent results in a smaller 
agglomeration. 
 
Since the integration conditions of both differential systems are identical apart from the initial 
values ˆ R 0
1 < ˆ R 0
2
, proposition 6 applies and notably leads to the result that R1 ≤ R2, S1 ≥ S2 and 
21 ωω ρρ ≤ : the second city is denser than the first in every location, households are more 
concentrated relative to jobs, and land rent is higher in every location. 
5. A particular set of specifications 
We did not demonstrate any other generic properties for our model in its general assumptions. 
However, we have been able to establish analytical properties by restricting ourselves to a 
particular case, by means of simplifying assumptions. 
5.1. Specific assumptions 
Regarding the geographical aspects of the model, we suppose that the N  jobs are distributed 
uniformly over an interval [0,ρ f ], with a density b: 
 
}0{1.)f( fb ρρρ ≤≤= , 
},{min)F( fb ρρρ =  for ρ ≥ 0, and  
},{min)(F 1 fbnn ρ=−  for n ≥ 0 
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We also suppose that land capacity is uniform from a radius of r0: 
 
λ=)L(r
 for r ≥ r0 or otherwise 0 
 
In addition, we postulate that transport cost is an affine function of r  and ρ :  
 
ρρ aarar ′−+= 0),T(  
 
If r0 ≤ ρ f , one would expect ′ a and a to be very close, but this specification allows us to 
distinguish between a central zone primarily devoted to employment, and a ring zone 
primarily devoted to housing. In principle, we restrict ourselves to positive transport costs, 
although we put no absolute value in the T  function. When ρ f = r0  we expect that 
)()(),T( 00 ρρ −′+−≥ rarrar  and therefore that a0 ≥ ( ′ a − a)r0. 
 
Concerning the economic aspects, we assume that the N  households each have one working 
member, a gross income Y  and the same utility function, a Cobb-Douglas function with two 
parameters α,β > 0: 
 
βαυ szsz 0),U( =
 
 
Let ′ α = α /(α + β)  and ′ β = β /(α + β)  be the reduced parameters. It is easy to show that the 
indirect utility function, the demand for dwelling space and the Solow type bid-rent function 
are, respectively: 
 
βαβ +−
= IRvIR 0),V(  for v0 = υ0 ′ α α ′ β β  
RIIR /),(sˆ β ′=  
ββ ′−
=
/1/1
0
)(),ψ( I
v
u
uI
 
 
5.2. Analytical solution of the differential system 
Let us note: 
 
- R0 = RA + aN /λ  rent in r0, 
- A = Y0
a
+
′ a 
ba2
λR0  for Y0 = Y − a0 
- B = β
α
′ a 
ba2
λR0  
- W = A + B − r0 =
Y0
a
+
′ a 
′ α ba2
λR0 − r0 
-  
In the appendix, we resolve the differential system and obtain the inverse function of the rent 
function: 
 
Breteau, Leurent V. 5 2010-07-23 
Housing and commuting in an extended monocentric model  12
 
r = A + B R(r)
R0
−W (R(r)
R0
) ′ β  (5.1) 
   
In addition: 
 
 H(r) = λ
a
(R0 − R)  (5.2) 
 
Since )F()( ρ=rH  and ρρ b=)F( , we link residential rent with place of employment: 
 
 
R(r)
R0
=1− ρ
˜ ρ
 for ˜ ρ = λR0
ab
 (5.3) 
 
By combining (5.1) and (5.3), we obtain residential location with respect to the place of 
employment: 
 
 
r = A + B(1− ρ
˜ ρ
) −W (1− ρ
˜ ρ
) ′ β 
 (5.4) 
 
All the variables of interest in our urban system can be deduced from the place of 
employment: we will successively look at residential location and the urban fringe distance, 
lot size and residential density, land rent, and household expenses and utilities. 
5.3. Residential location and the urban fringe distance 
 
In the appendix, we demonstrate the following property. 
 
Proposition 9. For a given workplace ρ , the residential position rω (ρ) : 
(i) Increases with minimum residential radius r0. 
(ii) Increases with gross income Y  and falls with a0 . 
(iii) Increases with ′ a and decreases with a if ′ a is fixed. If ′ a = a the total effect of a 
remains decreasing. 
(iv) Increases with job density b; but decreases with job radius ρ f  and with land density λ. 
(v) Decreases with alternative rent RA . 
(vi) Increases with β  and decreases with α . 
 
This proposition applies for any residential location, therefore, because of the monotony of 
the relations, for any interval of average residential location [ρ1,ρ2]. 
The proposition is immediately transposed for the distance between home and work, 
ρρρ ω −= )()( rD . The influence of the parameters other than a0 , a and ′ a is also transposed 
onto the cost of transport, ρρρρρ ωω aararT ′−+== )())(,T()(
~
0 . 
 
The average residential location is: 
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r =
Y0
a
+
′ a 
a
( ˜ ρ
′ α 
−
β
α
ρ f
2
) − (Y0
a
+
′ a ˜ ρ
a ′ α 
− r0)
˜ ρ
ρ f
1− (1− ρ f
˜ ρ )1+ ′ β 
1+ ′ β 
 
 
The average commuting distance can be deduced from this by subtracting 12 ρ f . The average 
transport cost is, with t =1− ρ f
˜ ρ = RA /R0 : 
 
T = Y + ′ a 
′ α 
( ˜ ρ − ρ f
2
) − (Y0 +
′ a ˜ ρ
′ α 
− ar0)
˜ ρ
ρ f
1− t1+ ′ β 
1+ ′ β  
 
In our model, the centre of the agglomeration is primarily a reference used to identify the 
spatial position of each location. Since the central point does not represent the workplace, for 
a household established in r , the commuting distance is not the same as r , by contrast with 
the basic monocentric model. 
Figure 1 shows residential location in relation to the workplace for several values of a  and 
a′ . The application parameters are inspired by the Paris region: 1.7 million jobs in a central 
area with a radius of 5 km; an urbanisation boundary radius of 20 km, land capacity of around 
6 km² per radial kilometre (restricted to households employed in the centre), alternative rent 
of €8/m² per month, gross income of 2,500 euros per month, utility parameters of ′ α = 0.72 
and ′ β = 0.28 . We estimated a unit transport cost of some €0.25/km for each outward or 
return journey. 
 
 
Figure 1 - Effect of the transport costs on the residential location with respect to the 
workplace 
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Figure 2 shows the influence of the land capacity on the urban fringe distance and the average 
lot size of households. It emphasizes the choice of a land capacity of 6 km2 per radial 
kilometre, as it gives appropriate urban fringe distance (20 km) and average lot size (70 m2). 
 
 
Figure 2 - Effect of the land capacity on the urban fringe distance and lot size 
 
With a fixed population N , the increasing influence of job density b on residential location is 
reinforced by the decreasing influence of the employment fringe distance, which is itself 
decreasing, since the product b.ρ f = N  is fixed. Figure 3 shows the influence of the 
employment fringe distance on the urban fringe distance and the average home-to-work 
distance. 
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Figure 3 - Effect of the employment fringe distance on the average home-to-work distance 
and the urban fringe distance 
 
5.4. Residential density and lot size 
 
From the correspondence between places of employment and of residence in )(ρωrr =  we 
know the residential density: 
 
ω
ρ
r
rH
&
&
)f()( =  with αω ρ
ρ
ρ
β
ρ
′−
−
′
+−= )
~
1(
~~
WBr&
 
BW
b
rH
−−
′
=
′−αρρβ
ρ
)~/1(
~
)(&  
 
Density has a hyperbolic shape based on ρ . Function ωr&  is positive and increasing, therefore 
ωrH o&  decreases with ρ  and likewise H&  decreases with r : residential density decreases with 
distance from the city centre. 
 
Lot size (dwelling space) is simply deduced from residential density, since land capacity per 
unit of radial distance is constant: 
 
ω
λλ
r
brHrH
r
rs &
&&
=== )()(
)L()(
 at )(ρωrr = . 
 
Individual living space increases as the workplace becomes further from the centre, hence 
also as residential location becomes further from the centre. 
 
The following proposition is demonstrated in the appendix. 
 
Proposition 10 (Sensitivity of lot size and residential density). For a given workplace ρ , 
function )(ρωr&  varies depending on a parameter as does residential location )(ρωr . 
Therefore lot size, which is positively proportional to )(ρωr& , is affected by a parameter in the 
same direction as residential location. 
Local residential density, which is the reciprocal of lot size, varies in the opposite direction to 
residential position, therefore: 
(i) It diminishes with minimum residential radius r0. 
(ii) It diminishes with gross income Y  and increases with a0 . 
(iii) It diminishes with ′ a and increases with a if a′  is fixed. If ′ a = a the total effect of a  
remains increasing. 
(iv) It increases with land density λ. 
(v) It increases with alternative rent RA . 
(vi) It decreases with β  and increases with α . 
 
Since these properties are valid for any workplace, they also apply for the average lot size on 
any interval [ρ1,ρ2], in particular for the average lot size in the city. Since total residential 
density is inversely proportional to this average size, it varies with respect to a parameter as 
local residential density does, except for the influence of λ , for hs /λ= . 
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Figure 4 - Effect of employment fringe distance on residential density 
 
5.5. Land rent 
 
Condition (5.3) which links the land rent to the place of employment becomes: 
 
 )()
~
1()(~)( 0 ρλρ
ρρ bNaRRRrR A −+=−==  (5.5) 
 
Rent increases linearly with the place of employment. Therefore it also decreases with 
residential position, although in a less regular way. 
 
Where α = β , therefore 21=′=′ βα , condition (5.1) is reduced to 00 RRRR WBAr −+= , 
therefore R /R0  solves the second-degree equation x 2 − WB x +
A−r
B = 0, in which we take the 
decreasing solution with r : x* = W2B (1− 1− 4BW 2 (A − r)). Finally: 
R(r) = R0( W2B)2(1− 1− 4 BW 2 (A − r))
2
. 
The other variables in the model are deduced from this, beginning with ρω (r) then density 
H& , lot size s(r)  etc. 
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Figure 5 - Influence of transport cost on land rent 
 
The Figure 6 illustrates a result that the canonical model does not allow, the variation in land 
rent in response to variation in job density (with N constant): 
 
 
Figure 6 - Influence of employment fringe distance on land rent 
5.6. Net household income and expenditure 
 
We have already specified the cost of transport for a household employed in ρ . This 
household has a net income: 
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In addition, αω ρ
β
α
ρ
ρ
ρ ′−′
−
′
′
=−′= aWxaraaI
~
)(
d
)(~d
& . 
 
Since the household utility function is a Cobb-Douglas function, housing expenditure is 
)(~)(~).(~ ρβρρ IRs ′= , and other goods consumption is )(~)(~ ραρ Iz ′= . 
 
The formula ρρ /d)(~dI  enables us to find the two typical cases where net income decreases 
(respectively increases) with residential location. 
 
In the first extreme case, 0/d)(~d ≤ρρI  is equivalent to aWxa βαρ α ′′≤′ ′~  at any point 
ρρ ~/1−=x . The constraint is greatest in x = 1 i.e. ρ = 0. In this case it becomes 
)(~ 00 arYa −′≤′ βρ , or else: 
 
)(]1[ 00 araY
aN
R
a Af −−′≤+′ βλρ
 
 
It is sufficient to consider a gross income large enough to meet this condition, or a low 
enough unit cost a′ , i.e. sufficient massification of transport, or a sufficiently small job radius 
resulting in a deconcentration of housing relative to jobs. This kind of city is quasi-
monocentric. 
 
At the other extreme, the condition is that 0/d)(~d ≥ρρI  in any ρ , therefore aWxa βαρ α ′′≥′ ′~  
for any x ∈ [t,1] where ρ
ρ
~1
0
fA
R
Rt −== . The condition imposes the strongest constraint when 
x = t , at which point it implies that aWta βαρ α ′′≥′ ′~  i.e. ]~)([~ 00 ραβρ α aarYta ′+−′′≥′ ′ , which 
is equivalent to: 
 
)(][ 000 arYtb
R
a
a
−
′′≥′−
′
′ βαβλ α
 
 
This condition requires that t ′ α ≥ ′ β . Assuming this last condition to be true (which means 
that λβ α /)1( /1 aNRA ≥−′ ′− ), it is sufficient to consider aa /′  large enough or b  small enough 
or λ  large enough for the condition to be met. A high b/λ  corresponds to a concentration of 
housing relative to jobs, whereas a relatively high aa /′  corresponds to city centre congestion. 
This kind of city is eccentric, which means that a household’s location becomes increasingly 
favourable the further it is from the centre. 
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Figure 7 - The stylized cases: Transport cost changes with distance from the city centre 
 
5.7. On utility distribution 
 
A household employed in ρ  obtains through its choice of residential location a utility of 
))(~),(~V(~ ρρρ IRu = , therefore in the simplified model: 
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Because of the properties of the general model, we know that this utility function increases 
with ρ , therefore as the workplace moves away from the city centre. Put another way, in 
addition to gross income, employment location constitutes a factor of utility, a factor of 
endowment that leads to a location reference on the residential market. 
 
Net income is not the appropriate indicator by which to evaluate the utility of the place of 
employment in monetary terms, since it is only an indirect factor. It is better to evaluate the 
equivalent gross income that would need to be allocated to a reference household for it to 
achieve utility ˜ uρ . We can decide the reference household arbitrarily, for example the initial 
household for which ρ = 0, or the “median” household employed in ρ f /2 . The equivalent 
income is )~,E()(~)(~ refref ρρρ uRTY +=  where ),E( uR  denotes the expenditure function which 
indicates the net income that the household needs in order to obtain utility level u where the 
price of living space is R. For a Cobb-Douglas type utility function, 
)/(1
0
)(),E( βαβ +′=
v
uRuR . 
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Relative to the initial household employed in 0 and living in r0, the equivalent income of the 
household employed in ρ  and living in )(ρωrr =  is (see appendix for calculation): 
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00
α
α
ρ
ρ
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Figure 8 - Influence of job density on equivalent gross income 
6. Conclusions 
We examined the equilibrium of residential locations for households in a closed city with 
absentee landlords, where jobs are spatially distributed. We assumed that jobs are established 
exogenously and bring identical gross income to households, which are homogeneous in their 
preferences but all have a fixed individual place of employment. Using these assumptions, we 
studied the influence of place of employment on residential location, dwelling space, 
household utility, as well as land rent, residential density and commuting distance. We 
showed that utility and dwelling space increase with distance from the centre, but that net 
income does not always behave monotonically. By simplifying the specifications, we 
described two extreme cases: on the one hand a quasi-monocentric city where housing is 
deconcentrated relative to jobs and transport becomes increasingly efficient as it nears the 
centre, with the result that net income decreases with distance from the centre. And on the 
other hand, an eccentric city where housing is constricted relative to jobs or transport is 
congested in the centre: in this kind of town, net income increases with the distance of 
residential location from the centre. 
 
We applied our model to the Paris region, in a very stylised way. In the future, we plan to 
explore the effects of urban policies (for location or transport), in order to characterise its 
effects, possibly differentiating between quasi-monocentric or eccentric cases. Potential future 
areas of research would be to model the link between transport congestion and the volume of 
local commuter journeys, and also employers’ wage policies. 
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8. Appendix 1: Properties of the general model  
8.1. Proof of Proposition 1 
 
To be able to apply Fujita’s rule 2.3 (1989), it is sufficient to show that the bid-rent curves of 
a household working in ρ1 are steeper than those of a household working in ρ2 , if ρ1 < ρ2 . 
Let Ψ1(x,u1)  and Ψ2(x,u2)  be two bid-rent curves for households working in ρ1 and ρ2  
respectively, with ρ1 < ρ2 , which intersect in x , i.e.: 
),(),(, 2211 uxuxR Ψ=Ψ∃  (not necessarily an R(r) ) 
Since ),T( rρ  is decreasing with ρ , we have: 
),T(),T( 21 xx ρρ <  therefore 2211 ),T(),T( IxYxYI =−>−= ρρ  
 
Let us define the uncompensated demand for space as ),(sˆ iIR , corresponding to the solution 
of (2.1) for household i . Assuming that dwelling space is a normal good, the effect of income 
on uncompensated demand is positive, therefore: 
),(),(sˆ),(sˆ),( 222111 uxSIRIRuxS =<=  
Finally, applying the envelope theorem to the bid-rent function (2.2) gives us the equality: 
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By combining the latter two relations, we get, assuming that r∂∂ T/  is constant or decreasing 
with ρ  for a given r : 
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This demonstrates that the bid-rent curve of the household working in ρ1 is steeper than that 
of the household working in ρ2 > ρ1. Therefore the point at which the land rent curve R(r) , 
unique to the urban equilibrium, meets a bid curve Ψi(x,ui )  is closer to the city centre for 
household 1 than for household 2, and if we consider optimal bids, the equilibrium location of 
household 1 is closer to the city centre than that of household 2. 
 
8.2. Proof of proposition 4 
(i) In (3.10), since 0T/ ≥∂∂ r  and 0sˆ ≥ , necessarily 0≤R& . Equation (3.10) is equivalent to 
(3.9), ∂W (r,ρ )∂r = 0  at point )(rωρρ = . With fixed ρ , we need to show that the function 
),( ρrWr a
 is maximal in r = rω (ρ) . By differentiating )),T(),(V(),( rYrRrW ρρ −=  we 
get: 
 
 
rIR
R
r
rW
∂
∂
∂
∂
−
∂
∂
=
∂
∂ TVV),(
&
ρ
 (8.1) 
 
The function Ir
rW
rg ∂
∂
∂
∂ V),()( /: ρρ a  has the same sign as ∂W (r,ρ )∂r  since 0
V ≥∂
∂
I . 
Now
r
IRRrg ∂
∂
−−=
T)( ),(sˆ.)( &ρ
 since IRIR ∂∂∂∂−= VV /),(sˆ . As ),T( rρρ a  is a decreasing 
function, rIrY ,),T( ρρρ =−a  is increasing, and therefore ),(sˆ ,rIR ρρ a  is also increasing, 
since sˆ  increases with income if dwelling space is a normal good. Moreover 0≤R&  does not 
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vary with ρ . Thus the function )()( )()( rgr ρρϕρ =a  is an increasing function of ρ . This 
function cancels out at )(rωρρ =  if (3.10) is verified. From this we successively deduce: 
))(()( )()( rrr ωρϕρϕ <>   if )(rωρρ <>  
0)()( <>ρϕ r   if )(rωρρ <>  
0)()( <>rg ρ   if )(rωρρ <>   i.e. rr <>)(ρω  
r
rrW
r
rW
∂
∂<
>∂
∂
=
))(,(),( 0 ωρρ   if rr <>)(ρω  
Therefore, with fixed ρ , the function 
r
rW
r ∂
∂ ),( ρ
a  is positive if r ≤ rω (ρ)  then negative if 
r ≥ rω (ρ) : ),( ρrWr a  increases until rω (ρ)  then decreases, therefore rω (ρ)  is the sole 
maximal argument. We can therefore unambiguously define the maximum utility function for 
a household employed in ρ  and subject to price conditions R(r) : 
 
)),((~ ρρρ ωρ rWu =a  on ZF  
 
(ii) We need to demonstrate that the function )(rRr a  obtained by the differential system, 
and which is assumed to constitute the price conditions, does indeed coincide with optimised 
supply conditions: a supplier of living space in r  seeks to optimise their unit rent R(r)  by 
selecting the highest bids by households. For this, we simply need to show (a) that 
conditionally to the utilities ( ˜ uρ )ρ ∈ZF , each R(r)  is equal to a bid by a household who wants 
to bid in r  because it is here that they obtain maximum utility, and (b) that this bid is higher 
than that of the other households in the same position. 
(a) Let us show first that   r a R(r) coincides with bids by households working at ρ  in their 
optimised residential location rω (ρ) . Condition (3.5) ensures the equation for ρ f , in 
rω (ρ f ) = rA : 
)ˆ,()(
ff
urrRR AAA ρρΨ==
 
 
Let us show that the derivatives )(rR&  and dΨ /dr  for )ˆ,( )()( rr urr ωω ρρΨa  coincide in any 
location, which will ensure that the functions are equal at any point. Let )~,(),( ρρρϕ urr Ψ= , 
ψ(I,u)  denote Solow’s bid function and s(I,u)  Solow’s surface demand function for a net 
income I and a utility u. Since households have homogeneous preferences, functions ψ  and 
s do not depend on ρ . At the maximum bid point: 
 
s
usZrTY
ur
),(),()~,( −−=Ψ ρρρ  for s = s(I,u) and ρuu ~=
 
 
From this, we deduce ∂ϕ /∂ρ  by the envelope theorem, with fixed s: 
 
)
~ZT(1 ρρρ
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Since ),U(max),V( szIR =  for sR + z = I , ),U(),V( ssRIIR −=  in ),(sˆ IRs =  and by the 
envelope theorem, zIIR ∂∂∂∂ U//),V( = . Moreover, since Z  is the inverse function of U  
with fixed s, 
zu ∂
∂
∂
∂ UZ /1= . Therefore Iu ∂∂∂∂ VZ /1= . In addition, when condition (3.10) is met, 
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therefore also (3.9), then by the definition of ˜ uρ  the result is that )()(
V~
ρρ
ρ
ωω ρρ rr
I
I
u
∂
∂
⋅
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
. 
Bringing it all together, we find that : 
 








∂
∂
−
∂
∂
−−=
∂
∂
)(
)(
V
V),T(
V
V
ρ
ρ
ω
ω
ρρ
ρ
ρ
ϕ
r
rI
rI
rR
rI Ir
 
 
But ρρρ ∂−∂=∂∂ /),T(/ rI , therefore in r = rω (ρ) , 0/ =∂∂ ρϕ . 
Let us now look at the function ))(,()(ˆ ρϕϕ ωrrrr =a : 
 
rs
r
rrr
∂
∂
−=
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
=
T1
d
d
d
ˆd
ϕ
ρ
ρ
ϕϕϕ ω
 
 
This expression coincides with )(rR&  as defined by (3.10), which ensures the equality of the 
two primitive functions. Thus R(r)  gives the prices bid by households: ∀r ∈ rω (ZF ) , 
R(r) = Ψρ (r, ˜ uρ ) at r = rω (ρ) . 
(b) Let us next show that these prices exceed bids by the other households. Since the indirect 
utility function V  is decreasing in the rent variable R, a household employed in ρ  and facing 
conditions R(r)  fulfils the following property (Fujita property 2.4, 1989): 
),()(if)),,(V()),(V(,,
,,
urrRIurIrRr rr ρρρρρ ΨΨ∀∀ <
>
<
>
 
Since ˜ uρ  is the maximum utility for ρ  under conditions R, we deduce that: 
∀ρ , ∀r , )~,()( ρρψ uIrR r≥  
By combining with the condition R(r) = Ψρ (r, ˜ uρ )  at ρ = ρω (r), we get the result that 
∀r ∈ rω (ZF ) , )~,(max)( ρρρ ψ uIrR rZ F∈=  
To summarise, the curve R obtained by integrating the differential system (3.12) under 
condition (3.5) does indeed define the optimised supply conditions. 
 
(iii) It remains for us to show that the microeconomic conditions are compatible with the 
physical supply of living space, )L(r , both at local and global level. By relating the two terms 
of (3.12) to each other at point r , we identify that )L()( rsrh = , which ensures local 
compatibility (3.6) between the demand for living space by all households and local land 
capacity, under supply conditions R and demand conditions ˜ uρ . As regards global 
compatibility, condition (3.5) ensures that households residing between r0 and rA , therefore 
under conditions R, are equal in number to N . 
 
(iv) In all, conditions (3.5) and (3.12), which include condition (3.3), ensure conditions (3.2), 
(3.4) and (3.6), and are therefore sufficient to characterise (H,R) as a supply-demand 
equilibrium. 
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8.3. Proof of proposition 5 
(i) We know the signs of 0T/ ≥∂∂ r , 0sˆ ≥ , 0L ≥  and 0f ≥ .By (3.11) 0≥H&  therefore H  is 
increasing. And Ho1F−=ωρ  is increasing, through composition of two increasing functions. 
(ii) By (3.10), 0≤R&  therefore R decreases with r . 
(iii) The total derivative of the function ))(,( rrWr ωρa  is 
)(
d
d
r
W
r
W
r
W
ωρρ
&
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
=  
With 0/ =∂∂ rW  according to (8.1) and (3.10), whereas 0)( ≥rωρ&  since ρω  is increasing, 
and )T(V ρρ ∂
∂
−
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
I
W
 is non-negative as a product of two non-negative factors. 
(iv) We note )(
d
d
r
I
r
I
r
II ωρρ
&&
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
== . We also have: )(sˆ
d
d
r
IR
r
I
ωρρ
&&
∂
∂
+= . 
The total derivative of the function )(rSr a  is I
I
R
Rr
S
&&
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
=
sˆsˆ
d
d
, therefore 
)(sˆ)sˆsˆsˆ(
d
d
r
I
I
R
IRr
S
ωρρ
&&
∂
∂
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
=  
By the Slutsky equation, 
RIR ∂
∂
=
∂
∂
+
∂
∂ s~sˆ
sˆ
sˆ
 which is negative. Therefore the first term in 
dS /dr is positive as a product of two negative terms.  The second term is a product of three 
non-negative terms: 0≥ωρ& , 0≥∂
∂
−=
∂
∂
ρρ
TI
 and 
I
s
∂
∂ˆ
 which is non-negative if dwelling space 
is a normal good. In total, dS
dr
≥ 0 . 
8.4. Proof of proposition 6 
At the start of residential locations r0, R02 > R01 whereas ),0T( 00201 rYII −== : therefore 
S1(R,I) > S2(R,I) ≥ 0, which implies that h2(r0) > h1(r0)  and )()( 0201 rRrR && ≤ . Let us assume 
that the statement’s hypothesis on the current state is verified up to r  and consider ′ r = r + δr  
for a marginal increment δr . If S1 r ≥ S2 r  then h2(r) ≥ h1(r) , the difference H2 − H1 
increases: therefore ρω1 ≤ ρω 2  in ′ r since ii Ho1F−=ωρ  where 1F−  is increasing. Since 
),T( rρ
 decreases with ρ , we deduce that ),T(),T( 21 rr ′′≥′′ ρρ  and therefore I ′ ρ 1 , ′ r ≤ I ′ ρ 2 , ′ r . 
For land rent, if R1 < R2 then ′ R 1 = R1( ′ r ) < R2( ′ r ) = ′ R 2  even if 21 RR && ≥ : otherwise, if we take 
ˆ r ∈]r, ′ r ] such that R1( ˆ r ) = R2(ˆ r ) , since I1( ˆ r ) ≤ I2(ˆ r )  then S1( ˆ r ) ≤ S2( ˆ r )  therefore between r  
and ˆ r  the S1 and S2  curves would have intersected at a position ˜ r  such that 
)~,~(sˆ)~,~(sˆ 2211 IRIR =  given that ˜ R 1 < ˜ R 2, therefore from this point 21 RR && ≤  which makes the 
inequality ′ R 1 ≥ ′ R 2 impossible. Thus the inequality for R is maintained from r  to ′ r = r + δr , 
and therefore also the inequality for S . In all, the inequalities are true throughout the 
integration path. 
 
8.5. Proof of proposition 8 
(i) Algorithmic proof by a dichotomy method. Let us take an interval [R01,R02] where 
R01 < R02 . Initially we set [R01,R02] = [RA ,R∞ ] for a number R∞  arbitrarily large which makes 
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lot size very small and fills up condition H = N  before R has significantly decreased. Let us 
apply integration to ′ R = (R01 + R02) /2 : if termination produces RA  in rA  such that 
H(rA ) < N , then update the interval to [ ′ R ,R02] , otherwise to [R01, ′ R ]. According to 
proposition 6, any initial value R0 ∈ [RA ,R01]  is too low, whereas any initial value 
R0 ∈ [R02,R∞] is too high. Since the interval gradually shrinks, the algorithm converges 
towards a satisfactory solution ˆ R 0. 
 
(ii) The uniqueness comes from the conservation of the inequalities between the two state 
variables: if R01
<
>
R02  then H1(rA1) = N >< H2(rA1)  whereas R1(rA1) = RA
<
>
R2(rA1) , which 
prevents R02 from producing an equilibrium. 
 
9. Appendix 2: Resolution of the simplified differential system 
9.1. Link between land rent and residential distribution 
In the model specified in section 5, condition (3.12a) is expressed HR a && λ−= , therefore 
∆R = − aλ ∆H , and, where R0 denotes the value of R at r0: 
 
 R(r) = R0 −
a
λ H(r) for r ≥ r0 (9.1) 
 
The boundary condition gives RA = R0 −
a
λ N , therefore R0 = RA +
a
λ N . 
The rent at the initial location arises simply from the parameters of the model. 
9.2. Reduction to a simple differential equation 
By replacing R by its expression depending on H  in condition (3.12b), we obtain a simple 
differential equation in H : 
 
 H = 1
′ β 
λR0 − aH
Y − T
 where Y − T = Y0 − ar + ′ a H /b (9.2) 
 
9.3. Change of variable, transformed differential equation 
Let us change the variable by taking r = H−1(n) for n ∈ [0,N], therefore Hr && /1= . Condition 
(9.2) becomes 
anR
narY
r b
a
−
+−
′=
′
0
0
λβ&  
Or: 
 
 )()( 00 nYaranRr ba′+′=′+− ββλ&  (9.3) 
 
9.4. Homogeneous equation 
The homogeneous equation associated with (9.3) is: 
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anR
a
r
r
−
′
−
=
0λ
β&
 
It allows a solution in the following form, where ˜ r0 is a constant: 
 
 β
λ
λ ′−
= ][~~
0
0
0 R
anR
rr  (9.4) 
 
9.5. Variation of the “constant” 
We now look for a solution to the transformed differential equation (9.3), in the form r = ν ⋅ ˜ r  
by varying the function ν . Since r
anR
a
r ~~
0 −
′
−
= λ
β&
, 
 
anR
nY
rr
anR
a
rv b
a
−
+
′
−=
−
′−
=
′
0
0
0
~
λβλ
β
&&
 
 
If we compare it with the expression rrr &&& ~~ ⋅+⋅= νν  obtained by deriving the definition of r , 
we get: 
 
( )ββββ
βββ
λλρλ
λλλλ
λβ
′−′−′−′′
′−′−′′
′
−
′+=
−+=
+
′=
)())(~()(
)]([)()(
~
1
00~
00
1
0~
0
0
0
RRaYR
RRYRR
Rr
nY
v
ba
a
r
ba
a
r
b
a
&
 
 
in which we noted λR = λR0 − an  and ˜ ρ = λR0 /(ab) . By integrating with respect to n , we 
obtain: 
 






+
′
′++= ′
′
′
′−
′′ ])()()~()( 100~1 20
α
α
β
ββ λβ
λρλ R
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R
aYRvv
ba
a
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9.6. Solution of the transformed equation 
By noting W = −ν1˜ r0, we finally obtain: 
 
)1(~)(
)~()(~~
0
0
0
0
1
0
01 2
R
R
a
a
a
Y
R
RW
RaY
R
R
rvrvr
ba
a
a
α
βρ
λρλ
λ
β
α
ββ
+
′
++−=
+′++==
′
′
′′′
 
 
At r0, R = R0  and r0 = −W + 1a Y0 +
′ a 
a
˜ ρ(1+ βα ), therefore 001 )1(~ rYW aaa −++= ′ αβρ . 
9.7. Residential location depending on the place of employment 
By setting A = 1
a
Y0 + ′ a a ˜ ρ  and B =
β
α
′ a 
a
˜ ρ, then W = A + B − r0 , the solution of the transformed 
equation takes the following form: 
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 β ′
−+= )(
00 R
RW
R
RBAr  (9.5) 
 
This form is the most appropriate for linking residential position r  with the place of 
employment ρ . This is because R and H  are linked by (9.1) whereas H  and ρ  are linked by 
H(r) = F(ρ) = bρ , therefore R(r) = R0 − abλ ρ . As a result: 
 
 
r = A + B(1− ρ
˜ ρ
) −W (1− ρ
˜ ρ
) ′ β  (9.6) 
 
9.8. Calculation of equivalent income 
 
])(1[~
])(~~[
)](~)([)(
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10. Appendix 3: Sensitivity of residential location 
This appendix presents the proofs of propositions 9 and 10. 
10.1. Simple influences 
To reveal the direction of variation of rω  in response to parameter changes, we can adapt 
expression (5.4). We note x = 1− ρ / ˜ ρ , which is non-negative because ρ ≤ ρ f ≤ ˜ ρ . 
First of all, rω = K0 + r0x
′ β 
 where K0 is independent of r0, therefore residential location 
increases with r0: this proves point (i) of the proposition. 
Then rω = 1a Y0(1− x ′ β ) + K1 where K1 is independent of Y0, hence point (ii). 
Next, rω = ′ a a K2 + K3  where K2 ≥ 0  and K3 are independent of ′ a . 
 
In addition, for point (vi), we reformulate (5.4) as follows: 
 
rω − r0 = (A − r0)(1− x ′ β ) + βα ′ a ba 2 (x − x
′ β )
 
 
Since function x ′ β  decreases with β  and increases with α , functions 1− x ′ β  and x − x ′ β  
increase with β  and decrease with α , as does function β /α . This influence is conserved by 
the product and sum of positive functions having the same property, therefore rω − r0  is an 
increasing function of β  and a decreasing function of α . 
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10.2. Framework of analysis for a complex influence 
Parameters b, a , λ , RA  have more complex influences, both direct and indirect via ˜ ρ . We 
can determine the influence of a parameter X  on ∆r = rω − r0  by considering the derivative 
function Xr ∂∆∂ / : this function is well-defined because ∆r  is sufficiently regular, and 
whether it has a positive or negative sign determines whether X  has an increasing or 
decreasing influence. 
 
Since ∆r = B(x −1) + W (1− x ′ β ) , 
∂∆r
∂X
=
∂W
∂X
(1− x ′ β ) + ∂B
∂X
(x −1) + (B − ′ β Wx− ′ α ) ∂x
∂X  
According to the expression x = 1− ρ / ˜ ρ ,  
∂x
∂X
=
ρ
˜ ρ2
∂ ˜ ρ
∂X
=
1− x
˜ ρ
∂ ˜ ρ
∂X
 
Therefore ∂x /∂X = 0  at point x = 1. Therefore if ∂
2∆r
∂x∂X
≥
≤
0  on [0,1] then ∂∆r∂X
≤
≥
0 . 
The next calculation is: 
∂2∆r
∂x∂X
= − ′ β x− ′ α ∂W
∂X
+
∂B
∂X
+ ′ α ′ β Wx− ′ α −1 ∂x
∂X
+
∂(∂x /∂X)
∂x
(B − ′ β Wx− ′ α ) 
 
The notation ∂∂x (∂x /∂X)  corresponds to a two-step operation: first 
∂x
∂X =
∂x
∂ ˜ ρ
∂ ′ ρ 
∂X , second the 
derivation of x  in response to variations of ρ , with ˜ ρ  fixed: so δx = −δρ / ˜ ρ . A more 
rigourous expression is : 
δ
δx (
∂x
∂ ˜ ρ
∂ ˜ ρ
∂X
) = δδx
1− x
˜ ρ
∂ ˜ ρ
∂X
= −
1
˜ ρ
∂ ˜ ρ
∂X  
Therefore 
∂2∆r
∂x∂X
= − ′ β x− ′ α ∂W
∂X
+
∂B
∂X
+ ′ α ′ β Wx− ′ α −1 ∂x
∂X
− (B − ′ β Wx− ′ α ) 1
˜ ρ
∂ ˜ ρ
∂X
 
 
10.3. Influence of job density 
Let us study the total influence of b, including via N = bρ f : 
R0 = RA +
aN
b
= RA + ab 1λ ρ f  
∂B
∂x = −
β
α
′ a 
a
λRA
b2
= −
B
b
t
  where t = RA /R0 <1 
∂W
∂b
=
1
′ β 
∂B
∂b  
∂ ˜ ρ
∂b = −
λ
ab2
RA = −
˜ ρ
b
t
  hence ∂x∂b = −
t
b
(1− x)
 and ∂∂x
∂x
∂b =
t
b
. 
Therefore: 
∂2∆r
∂x∂b
= − ′ α ′ β W (1− x)x− ′ α −1 t
b
− B t
b
(1− x− ′ α ) + t
b
[B(1− x− ′ α ) − ′ β x− ′ α (Y0
a
− r0)]
= − ′ α ′ β W (1− x)x− ′ α −1 t
b
−
t
b
′ β x− ′ α (Y0
a
− r0)
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The cross derivative is the sum of two negative terms, and therefore negative, which implies 
that b has an increasing influence on residential location. 
10.4. Influence of job radius 
As regards the influence of ρ f , including via N = bρ f , we first calculate: 
∂ ˜ ρ
∂ρ f
=1
  therefore ∂x∂ρ f
=
1− x
ρ f
 and ∂∂x
∂x
∂ρ f
= −
1
˜ ρ . 
Next: 
∂B
∂ρ f
=
β
α
′ a 
a
=
B
˜ ρ   and 
∂W
∂ρ f
=
1
′ β 
∂B
∂ρ f
=
1
′ β 
B
˜ ρ . 
Therefore: 
∂2∆r
∂x∂ρ f
=
B
˜ ρ
(1− x− ′ α )+ ′ α ′ β Wx− ′ α −1 1− x
˜ ρ
−
1
˜ ρ
[B − ′ β Wx− ′ α ]
= ′ α ′ β Wx− ′ α −1 1− x
˜ ρ
+
′ β 
˜ ρ
x−
′ α (Y0
a
− r0)
 
The cross derivative is the sum of two positive terms, and therefore positive, which implies 
that ρ f  has a decreasing influence on residential location. Thus, where job density b is 
constant, an increase of ρ f  is equivalent to an increase in the number of households, therefore 
to increasing land pressure, which increases residential density. 
10.5. Influence of the unit cost of transport 
Let us now look at the unit cost of transport in the residential area, a , initially independently 
of ′ a . We start by calculating: 
∂ ˜ ρ
∂a = −
˜ ρ
a
t   therefore ∂x∂a = −
1− x
a
t  and ∂∂x
∂x
∂a =
t
a
. 
Next: 
∂B
∂a = −
β
α
′ a 
ba2
(2λRA + ρ f ) = −
B
a
(1+ t)
  and ∂W∂a = −Y0a
−2 +
1
′ β 
∂B
∂a . 
This gives us: 
∂2∆r
∂x∂a
= −
B
a
(1+ t)(1− x− ′ α )+ ′ β Y0a−2x− ′ α − t 1− x
a
′ α ′ β Wx− ′ α −1 + t
a
[B − ′ β Wx− ′ α ] 
which we analyse as the sum of three terms influenced respectively by B, Y0 and r0. 
The term in B is: 
B
a
−(1+ t)(1− x− ′ α ) − t ′ α (1− x)x− ′ α −1 + t(1− x− ′ α ){ }= − B
a
(1− x− ′ α ) + ′ α t(1− x)x− ′ α −1{ } 
As t = RA
R0
= minρ
R
R0
= minρ x , on the effective domain ρ ∈ [0,ρ f ] we know that x ∈ [t,1]. 
Therefore 1− x− ′ α + ′ α t(1− x)x− ′ α −1 ≤1− x− ′ α + ′ α (x− ′ α − x ′ β ). 
Let us use ϕ(x) =1− ′ β x− ′ α − ′ α x ′ β  to denote this function, which takes the value ϕ(1) = 0 and 
has the derivative dϕ
d x
= ′ α ′ β [x− ′ α −1 − x− ′ α ]
 which is positive on [0,1]: therefore ϕ(x) ≤ 0 on 
this interval, which ensures that the term in B is positive. 
 
The term in Y0 is 
′ β Y0a−2 x− ′ α (1− t) − ′ α t(1− x)x− ′ α −1{ }= ′ β Y0a−2x− ′ α −1 x(1− t) − ′ α t(1− x){ } 
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The expression in brackets is reformulated: 
x(1− t) − ′ α t(1− x) = x − tx − ′ α t + ′ α tx = x(1− ′ β t) − ′ α t = x − t( ′ α + ′ β x)  
When x ≤1, so is ′ α + ′ β x ≤ 1 and, as t ≤ x , this term is positive, and therefore the term in Y0 
is also positive. 
 
Finally, the term in r0 is ′ β r0t 1− x
a
x
− ′ α −1 + r0
t
a
′ β x− ′ α = ′ β r0 t
a
x
− ′ α −1 ≥ 0. 
In all, as the sum of three positive terms, the cross derivative is positive, which ensures that 
the derivative is negative: residential location is closer to the centre when the unit cost of 
transport in the residential zone is higher. 
 
In the event that ′ a = a, the parameter a  continues to have a decreasing influence.Indeed, the 
effect on ˜ ρ  is maintained, whereas: 
B = β
α
˜ ρ
  therefore ∂B∂a = −
B
a
t
 and ∂W∂a = −Y0a
−2 +
1
′ β 
∂B
∂a . 
As a result: 
{ } )11()1()1(
][)1()1(
0
12
0
12
0
2
+
−
′′+−′−−′=
′
−+
−
−
′′+′+−−=
∂∂
∆∂
′−−′−−
′−−′−′−−′−
x
x
x
a
t
rxttxxaY
WxB
a
t
a
x
tWxxaYxt
a
B
ax
r
αβαβ
ββαβ
αα
αααα
 
The coefficient of r0 is positive, as is that of Y0 since 1≥ x ≥ t  therefore 1− t ≥1− x ≥ 0 , and 
also ′ α ≤1. 
 
Therefore the cross derivative is positive, which ensures that the total influence of a  on ∆r  is 
decreasing. 
10.6. Influence of alternative rent 
As regards the parameter RA : 
˜ ρ = λRA + aN
b
  therefore 
0
~~
RabRA
ρλ
∂
ρ∂
== , then ∂x∂RA
=
1− x
R0
 and ∂∂x
∂x
∂RA
= −
1
R0
. 
Next : ∂B∂RA
=
β
α
′ a 
a
∂ ˜ ρ
∂RA
=
B
R0
 and ∂W∂RA
=
1
′ β 
B
R0
. 
This gives us : 
∂2∆r
∂x∂RA
=
B
R0
(1− x− ′ α ) + ′ α ′ β Wx− ′ α −1 1− x
R0
−
1
R0
[B − ′ β Wx− ′ α ]
= ′ α ′ β Wx− ′ α −1 1− x
R0
+
′ β 
R0
x
− ′ α (Y0
a
− r0 )
 
This is the sum of two positive terms, therefore the cross derivative is positive and the 
derivative is negative: an increase in RA  brings residential location closer to the centre. 
10.7. Influence of land capacity 
The parameter λ  has exactly the same effect as parameter RA  on the model’s results, because 
both parameters appear in the formulas solely in the grouped form λRA . 
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10.8. Sensitivity of lot size (Proposition 10) 
 
We analyse the sensitivity of )(ρωr&  to a parameter X  by considering the function ω∂∂ rX X &a . 
Since rr ∆= ∂ρ∂ω& , formally we have: 
X
r
X
r
r
X ∂∂
∆∂
=
∂∂
∆∂
=
∂
∂
ρρ
ρω
22
)(&  
as rω  is a sufficiently regular function. Moreover, we have already established the variations 
of ∂2∆r /(∂x∂X) with respect to x  that would correspond solely to variations in ρ , according 
to the relation δx = −δρ / ˜ ρ . Therefore: 
∂2∆r
∂ρ∂X =
δ
δρ
∂∆r
∂X
= −
1
˜ ρ
δ
δx
∂∆r
∂X
= −
1
˜ ρ
∂2∆r
∂x ∂X
 
The sign of ∂2∆r /(∂ρ∂X), therefore of )(ρω∂∂ rX & , is the opposite of that of ∂2∆r /(∂x∂X ), 
therefore identical to that of ∂∆r /∂X = ∂rω /∂X . Thus the function )(ρωrX &a  varies 
according to X  as )(ρωrX a , and the results of Proposition 9 are also true for )(ρωr& . 
 
